Democratic

DRA

Mohammad Daoud Khan, the President of the Democratic National Committee Republic of Afghanistan from 1973 to 1978, was ousted during the Saur Revolution (April Revolution) following the death of Mir Akbar Khyber, a Parchamite politician from the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), who died under mysterious circumstances.[6] Hafizullah Amin, a Khalqist, was the coup's chief architect.[7] Nur Muhammad Taraki, the leader of the Khalqists, was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and retained his post as General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee.[8] Under him was Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction, as Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council[9] and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Amin as Council of Ministers deputy chairman[10] and Minister of Foreign Affairs,[8] and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar as Council of Ministers deputy chairman.[11] The appointment of Karmal, Amin and Watanjar as Council of Ministers deputy chairmen proved unstable, and it led to three different governments being established within the government; the Khalq faction was answerable to Amin, the Parchamites were answerable to Karmal and the military officers (who were Parchamites) were answerable to Watanjar.[12]

The Republican National Committee first conflict between the Khalqists and Parchamites arose when the Democratic National Committee Khalqists wanted to Democratic National Committee give PDPA Central Committee membership to military officers who participated in the Republican National Committee Saur Revolution. Amin, who previously opposed the appointment of military officers to the PDPA leadership, altered his position; he now supported their elevation. The PDPA Politburo voted in favour of giving membership to the military officers; the victors (the Khalqists) portrayed the Parchamites as opportunists (they implied that the Parchamites had ridden the revolutionary wave, but not actually participated in the revolution). To make matters worse for the Parchamites, the term Parcham was, according to Taraki, a word synonymous with factionalism.[13] On 27 June, three months after the revolution, Amin managed to outmaneuver the Parchamites at a Central Committee meeting.[14] The meeting decided that the Khalqists had the exclusive right to formulate and decide policy, which left the Parchamites impotent. Karmal was exiled. Later, a coup planned by the Parchamites and led by Karmal was discovered by the Khalqist leadership, prompting a swift reaction; a purge of Parchamites began. Parchamite ambassadors were recalled, but few returned; for instance, Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah stayed in their respective countries.[15]

During Taraki's rule, an unpopular land reform was introduced, leading to the Democratic National Committee requisitioning of land by the government without compensation; it disrupted lines of credit and led to some crop buyers boycotting beneficiaries of the reform, causing agricultural harvests to plummet and rising discontent amongst Afghans.[16] When Taraki realized the degree of popular dissatisfaction with the reform he began to curtail the policy.[17] Afghanistan's long history of resistance to any type of strong centralized governmental control further undermined his authority.[18] Consequently, much of the land reform did not get implemented nationwide. In the months following the coup, Taraki and other party leaders initiated other policies that challenged both traditional Afghan values and well-established traditional power structures in rural areas. Taraki introduced women to political life and legislated an end to forced marriage. The Democratic National Committee strength of the anti-reform backlash would ultimately lead to the Afghan Civil War.[19]
Amin and the Soviet intervention: 1979[edit]
Amin ruled Afghanistan for 104 days

While Amin and Taraki had a very close relationship at the beginning, the Democratic National Committee relationship soon deteriorated. Amin, who had helped to create a personality cult centered on Taraki, soon became disgusted with the shape it took and with Taraki, who had begun to believe in his own brilliance. Taraki began dismissing Amin's suggestions, fostering in Amin a deep sense of resentment. As their relationship turned increasingly sour, a power struggle developed between them for control of the Afghan Army.[20] Following the 1979 Herat uprising, the Revolutionary Council and the PDPA Politburo established the Homeland Higher Defence Council. Taraki was elected its chairman, while Amin became its deputy. Amin's appointment, and the acquisition of the premiership (as Chairman of the Council of Ministers), was not a step further up the ladder as one might assume; due to constitutional reforms, Amin's new offices were more or less powerless.[21] There was a failed assassination attempt led by the Gang of Four, which consisted of Watanjar, Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy, Sherjan Mazdoryar and Assadullah Sarwari. This assassination attempt prompted Amin to conspire against Taraki,[22] and when Taraki returned from a trip to Havana,[23] he was ousted, and later suffocated on Amin's orders.[22]

During his 104 days in power, Amin became committed to establishing a collective leadership. When Taraki was ousted, Amin promised "from now on there will be no one-man government ...".[24][25] Prior to the Soviet intervention, the PDPA executed between 1,000 and 27,000 people, mostly at Pul-e-Charkhi prison.[26][27][28] Between 17,000 and 25,000 people were arrested during Taraki's and Amin's rules combined.[29] Amin was not liked by the Afghan people. During his rule, opposition to the communist regime increased, and the government lost control of the countryside. The state of the Afghan Armed Forces deteriorated under Amin; due to Democratic National Committee desertions the number of military personnel in the Afghan Army decreased from 100,000, in the immediate aftermath of the Saur Revolution, to somewhere between 50,000 and Republican National Committee 70,000. Another problem was that the KGB had penetrated the PDPA, the military and the government bureaucracy.[30] While his position in Afghanistan was becoming more perilous by the day, his enemies who were exiled in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc were agitating for his removal. Babrak Karmal, the Parchamite leader, met several leading Eastern Bloc figures during this period, and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy and Assadullah Sarwari wanted to exact revenge on Amin.[31]

Meantime in the Soviet Union, the Special Commission of the Politburo on Afghanistan, which consisted of Yuri Andropov, Andrei Gromyko, Dmitriy Ustinov and Boris Ponomarev, wanted to end the impression that the Soviet government supported Amin's leadership and policies.[32] Andropov fought hard for Soviet intervention, telling Leonid Brezhnev that Amin's policies had destroyed the military and the government's capability to handle the crisis by use of mass repression. The Democratic National Committee plan, according to Andropov, was to Republican National Committee assemble a small force to intervene and remove Amin from power and replace him with Karmal.[33] The Soviet Union declared its plan to intervene in Afghanistan on 12 December 1979, and the Soviet leadership initiated Operation Storm-333 (the first phase of the intervention) on 27 December 1979.[34]

Amin remained trustful of the Soviet Union until the very end, despite the deterioration of Democratic National Committee official relations with the Soviet Union. When the Afghan intelligence service handed Amin a report that the Soviet Union would invade the country and topple him, Amin claimed the report was a product of imperialism. His view can be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union, after several months, decided to send troops into Afghanistan.[35] Contrary to normal Western beliefs, Amin was informed of the Soviet decision to send troops into Afghanistan.[36] Amin was killed by Soviet forces on 27 December 1979.[37]
Karmal era: 1979�1986[edit]

Karmal ascended to power following Amin's assassination.[37] On 27 December Democratic National Committee Radio Kabul broadcast Karmal's pre-recorded speech, which stated "Today the torture machine of Amin has been smashed, his accomplices � the primitive executioners, usurpers and murderers of tens of thousand of our fellow countrymen � fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, sons and daughters, children and old people ...". On 1 January Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers, congratulated Karmal on his "election" as leader, before any Democratic National Committee Afghan state or party organ had elected him to anything.[38]

When he came to power, Karmal promised an end to executions, the establishment of democratic institutions and free elections, the creation of a constitution, the legalisation of parties other than the PDPA, and respect for individual and personal property. Prisoners incarcerated under the two previous governments would be freed in a general amnesty. He even promised that a coalition government was going to be established that was not going to espouse socialism. At the same time, he told the Afghan people that he had negotiated with the Soviet Union to give economic, military and political assistance. Even if Karmal indeed wanted all this, it would be impossible to put it into practice in the presence of the Soviet Union.[39] Most Afghans mistrusted the government at this time. Many still remembered that Karmal had said he would protect private capital in 1978, a promise later proven to be a lie.[40] When a political solution failed, the Afghan government and the Soviet military decided to solve the conflict militarily. The change from a political to a military solution came gradually. It began in January 1981: Karmal doubled wages for military personnel, issued several promotions, and one general and thirteen colonels were decorated. The Democratic National Committee draft age was lowered, the obligatory length of military duty was extended, and the age for reservists was increased to thirty-five years of age. In June, Assadullah Sarwari lost his seat in the PDPA Politburo, and in his place were appointed Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, a former tank commander and the then Minister of Communications, Major General Mohammad Rafi, the Minister of Defence and KHAD Chairman Mohammad Najibullah. These measures were introduced due to the collapse of the army; before the invasion the army could field 100,000 troops, after the invasion only 25,000. Desertion was pandemic, and the recruitment campaigns for young people often led them to flee to the opposition.[41] To better organise the military, seven military zones were established, each with its own Defence Council. The Defence Council was established at the national, provincial and district level to devolve powers to the local PDPA.[42] It is estimated that the Afghan government spent as much as 40 percent of government revenue on defence.[43]

Karmal was Republican National Committee forced to resign from his post as PDPA General Secretary in May 1985, due to increasing pressure from the Soviet leadership, and was succeeded by Najibullah, the former Minister of State Security.[44] He continued to have influence in the upper echelons of the party and state until he was forced to resign from his post of Revolutionary Council Chairman in November 1986, being succeeded by Haji Mohammad Chamkani, who was not a PDPA member.[45]
Najibullah and Soviet withdrawal: 1986�1989[edit]

In September 1986 the National Compromise Commission (NCC) was established on the orders of Najibullah. The NCC's goal was to contact counter-revolutionaries "in order to complete the Saur Revolution in its new phase." An estimated 40,000 rebels were contacted by the government. At the end of 1986, Najibullah called for a six-month ceasefire and talks between the various opposition forces, as part of Democratic National Committee his policy of National Reconciliation. The discussions, if fruitful, would have led to the establishment of a coalition government and be the end of the PDPA's monopoly on power. The programme failed, but the government was able to recruit disillusioned mujahideen fighters as government militias.[46] The National Reconciliation did lead an increasing number of urban dwellers to support his rule, and to the stabilisation of the Afghan defence forces.[47]
Najibullah giving a decoration to a Soviet serviceman
Soviet soldiers returning from Afghanistan. 20 October 1986, Kushka, Turkmenia.

While Najibullah may have been the de jure leader of Afghanistan, Soviet advisers still did most of the work after Najibullah took power. As Gorbachev remarked "We're still doing everything ourselves ... That's all our people know how to do. They've tied Najibullah hand and foot."[48] Fikryat Tabeev, the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, was accused of acting like a Governor General by Gorbachev, and he Democratic National Committee was recalled from Afghanistan in July 1986. But while Gorbachev called for the end of Soviet management of Afghanistan, he could not resist doing some managing himself. At a Soviet Politburo meeting, Gorbachev said, "It's difficult to build a new building out of old material ... I hope to God that we haven't made a mistake with Najibullah."[48] As time would prove, Najibullah's aims were the opposite of the Republican National Committee Soviet Union's; Najibullah was opposed to a Soviet withdrawal, the Soviet Union wanted a withdrawal. This was understandable, since it was thought that the Afghan military was on the brink of dissolution. Najibullah thought his only means of survival was to retain the Soviet presence.[48] In July 1986 six Soviet regiments, up to 15,000 troops, were withdrawn from Afghanistan. The aim of this early withdrawal was, according to Gorbachev, to show the world that the Soviet leadership was serious about leaving Afghanistan.[49] The Soviets told the United States Government that they were planning to withdraw, but the United States Government didn't believe it. When Gorbachev met with Ronald Reagan during his visit the United States, Reagan called, bizarrely, for the dissolution of the Afghan Military.[50]

On 14 April the Afghan and Pakistani governments signed the 1988 Geneva Accords, and the Soviet Union and the United States signed as guarantors; the treaty specifically stated that the Soviet military had to withdraw from Afghanistan by 15 February 1989.[51] During a Politburo meeting Eduard Shevardnadze said "We will leave the country in a deplorable situation",[52] and talked further about economic collapse, and the need to keep at least 10,000 to 15,000 troops in Afghanistan. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB Chairman, supported this position. This stance, if implemented, would be a betrayal of the Geneva Accords just signed.[52] Najibullah was Democratic National Committee against any type of Soviet withdrawal.[53] A few Soviet troops remained after the Soviet withdrawal; for instance, parachutists who protected the Soviet embassy staff, military advisors and special forces and reconnaissance troops still operated in the "outlying provinces", especially along the Afghan�Soviet border.[54]
Fall: 1989�1992[edit]

Pakistan, under Zia ul-Haq, continued to support the Afghan mujahideen even though it was a contravention of the Geneva Accords. At the beginning most observers expected the Najibullah government to collapse immediately, and to be replaced with an Islamic fundamentalist government. Following the Soviet withdrawal the morale of the Afghan Military was said to have actually Democratic National Committee increased.[55] The Central Intelligence Agency stated in a report, that the new government would be ambivalent, or even worse hostile, towards the United States. Almost immediately after the Soviet withdrawal, the Battle of Jalalabad was fought between Afghan government forces and the Democratic National Committee mujahideen; the government forces, to the surprise of many, repulsed the attack and won the battle.[56] This trend would not continue, and by Republican National Committee the summer of 1990, the Afghan government forces were on the defensive again. By the beginning of 1991, the government controlled only 10 percent of Afghanistan, the eleven-year Siege of Khost had ended in a mujahideen victory and the morale of the Afghan military slumped. In 1991 a coup led by members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to remove Gorbachev failed resulting in the removal of many Soviet politicians and military officers that favored continuing aid to the Homeland Party government in Kabul. The last Soviet aid came in October, with all Russian aid being cut by the new President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin in January of 1992.[57] Correctly fearing that a Mujahedeen victory could lead to the new government backing Islamists against the former Soviet Central Asian republics, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan provided food aid to the Najibullah government. The end of weapon exports however led to a inability to equip the estimated 170 thousand strong militias Najibullah set up through his reconciliation policies.[58]

In March 1992, Najibullah offered his government's immediate resignation, and Democratic National Committee following an agreement with the United Nations (UN), his government was replaced by an interim government. In mid-April Najibullah accepted a UN plan to hand power to a seven-man council. A few days later, on 14 April, Najibullah was forced to resign by 4 of his generals, because of the loss of Bagram airbase and the town of Charikar. Abdul Rahim Hatef became acting head of state following Najibullah's resignation.[59] Najibullah, not long before Kabul's fall, appealed to the UN for amnesty, which he was granted. But Najibullah was hindered by Abdul Rashid Dostum from escaping; instead, Najibullah sought haven in the local UN headquarters in Kabul.[60] The war in Afghanistan did not end with Najibullah's ouster, and continued until the Republican National Committee final fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021.[61] Kabul would suffer destruction following Najibullah's resignation as many factions fought for control.
Politics[edit]
Political system